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On the dynamics of quality student enrollment at institutions of higher education
ARTICLE

Economics of Education Review Volume 21, Number 5 ISSN 0272-7757 Publisher: Elsevier Ltd

Abstract

Academic institutions seeking excellence attract good students through reputation. How high should their academic level be set? Suppose that teaching seeks to maximize aggregate discounted student achievement, while reputation deducts from this the risk of student failure. The inter-temporal optimal policy (a) tailors academic objectives and standards to maximize the achievement of its current students; (b) optimizes achievement using as many instruments as possible, such as individual teaching, tutorials, teaching according to skill; (c) minimizes the costs of these policies for students. In an illustrative empirical study we find that the SAT levels of attracted students follow a convergent process as predicted, with graduation rates, expenditure and reputation combining to attract better future students.

Citation

Mayer-Foulkes, D. On the dynamics of quality student enrollment at institutions of higher education. Economics of Education Review, 21(5), 481-489. Elsevier Ltd. Retrieved August 11, 2024 from .

This record was imported from Economics of Education Review on March 1, 2019. Economics of Education Review is a publication of Elsevier.

Full text is availabe on Science Direct: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0272-7757(01)00036-X

Keywords

References

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