



The human person as a fundamental category of sexual and gender education: a phenomenological approach

La persona humana como categoría fundamental de la educación sexual: una perspectiva fenomenológica

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Abstract

In this article we discuss the ontological foundations of the human person for sexual and gender education. The extremes of materialism, mechanism, idealism and essentialism tends to annul bodiliness when approaching these foundations, thus we explore the necessity of an anthropological foundation of body-centered sexuality. Methodologically, we made a choice for the phenomenology of bodiliness in Merleau-Ponty and analyzed the concrete aspects of bodiliness and sociableness, discussing its overture to transcendence and its challenges of the necessary utopias to the exercise of human freedom. We conclude that bodiliness is not a sufficient condition, but it is a necessary condition for the integral study of human sexuality, which allows us to situate sociableness and develop transcendence. This prevents a study of sexuality without body, as it occurs in the essentialist and mechanistic approaches.

Keywords: Philosophy, psychoanalysis, sexuality, education, anthropology, phenomenology.

Resumen

En este artículo discutimos los fundamentos ontológicos de la persona humana para la educación sexual. Delante de extremos materialistas mecanicistas e idealistas esencialistas, el tratamiento de esa fundamentación tiende a anular la corporeidad, de ese modo, exploramos la necesidad de una fundamentación antropológica de la sexualidad centrada en el cuerpo. Optamos metodológicamente por la fenomenología de la corporeidad en Merleau-Ponty y analizamos los aspectos concretos de la corporeidad y sociabilidad, discutiendo su apertura para la transcendencia, con los desafíos de las utopías necesarias al ejercicio de la libertad humana. Concluimos que la corporeidad no es suficiente, pero es un punto de partida necesario al estudio integral de la sexualidad humana, que permite situar la sociabilidad y desarrollar la transcendencia, sin ceder a una sexualidad sin cuerpo, como ocurre en los enfoques esencialista y mecanicista.

Descriptores: Filosofía, psicoanálisis, sexualidad, educación, antropología, fenomenología.

1. Introduction

When studying human sexuality some questions are considered whose first principle is the body. However, the body experiences are not merely sensorial, but also symbolic. Thus, it is possible to forget that sexuality happens first in the body, and reduce it to some symbolical elements of language. To avoid such reduction, the methodological approach was used which begins with the body and remains close to any reflection.

When thinking about our own self, it is understood as a unit. Humans have a body, a history, a life. This unit, however, it is not so simple, relationships are established and in every space of these relationships there is a specific self and an own world.

If the own self finds an own world in every field of relationships, the way it makes sense of that world depends upon a language that is linked to it.

Ontology is defined as the study of the principles of language that is made up by a lived world, which is why the study of the meaning of the being is discussed from an intentional approach (Ferraz, 2008, p.16).

In this text, the experiences that are being unified around sexuality will be observed, based on the body experience.

2. Methodology: the option for the phenomenological perspective

If the human person wanders through several categories of ontology, one could research for the existence of a pure self. That is, from a self that moves towards multiple relationships. This question can be summarized in a shorter but more difficult one: What is the own self made of?

A hypothesis states that the own self is constituted only by its external relationships and on language practice, according to what was proposed by Marx in the 6th theses on Feuerbach...

“the human essence is not an inherent abstraction to every individual; it is actually a complex set of social relationships” (Marx and Engels, 1976, p. 4).

This hypothesis could be taken to the extreme when we state that there is no own self. There are only relationships that end up defining the own self.

Another hypothesis states that the own self is based on intuition. There is a first intuition upon which the relationships are established, as is proposed by the long French tradition of philosophy, with a framework based on Descartes (1999, p. 62) and reaching Merleau-Ponty (2006b, p. 493).

Taken to the extreme, that hypothesis could mix the terms intuition and imagination. This way the own self is barely and imagined internal entity upon which humans build up our relationships.

Those two hypotheses oppose to a third previous hypotheses, taken from the ancient western philosophy: The one that states there is an abstract human essence, metaphysical entity that results in the own self: The Soul. Philosophically speaking, Pythagoras's, Socrates' and Plato's souls (Frede, & Reis, 2009, pp. 21, 145) are inherited and when it is proposed, it precedes the biological, psychological and social relationships.

As far as this research paper concerns, the methodological choice was chosen from a start: the principle of the own self is based on intuition, being this intuition originated not from imagination but from the human body. This intuition does not end up with the own self, it is merely its principle, since the own self is completed in a body that has relationships, in a body that lives in a world.

It is a placing aligned towards the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, mainly in his works *A Estrutura do Comportamento* (Merleau-Ponty, 2006a) and *Fenomenologia da Percepção* (Merleau-Ponty, 2006b).



The ontological world and body that we reencounter in the heart of the subject are not the world in idea or the body in idea, it is the world the one contract in a global take, they are the own as a cognitive - body (Merleau-Ponty, 2006b, p. 547).

It is called *choice*, because the aim of placing the human person as main category of sexual education must be fulfilled, and that choice is one of the hypotheses that allows understanding this situation based on the body, without yielding to a mechanistic perspective, from which neither marxism or positivism are out of the question.

The choice of taking the body as a starting point, in turn, gets away from the idealist perspective, since this perspective would permit to discuss sexual education, in spite of the body or without it, as it was possible with the ancient philosophy.

The methodological option by the Merleau-Ponty phenomenology leads to a journey through three principles of an ontology of the human person. The idea is to start from the two principles that are displayed in their materialness, which are the corporeality and socialization and to later discuss the principle of the possibilities, which is transcendence.

The body, as a principle, is not enough to understand the human being because the body is *placed* by personal, social and historical conditions; therefore, society must be analyzed and finally an understanding on transcendence, in order to discuss how that body moves through worlds of relationships to turn them into something new.

Therefore, those three processes show up as a principle of the human being, because it is the human being who lives - in the body and in the society- with the purpose of building up a destiny, which in philosophy is called *project*.

3. Results and discussions

3.1. Corporeity

The biological history has shown the natural evolution resulted in a self-organized body

for the individual survival and the species survival. It is impossible to talk about interiority without its assumption: the organism. Therefore the human interiority is a resulting phenomenon from a cosmological strategy: *autopoiesis*.

Autopoiesis is a term proposed by Maturana and Varela (2006, p.16) that refers to a way of organization of the matter in order to optimize the use of energy. It is a strategy that arises to a reaction towards the entropy. In other words, the entropy refers to an unavailability of energy in a system. Every time a process is done, entropy increases, that is, the spent energy can be recovered when doing the process.

With superior animals, the auto organization occurred in order to articulate different systems, such as, the neuro-physiological system. In the case of humans, the neuro-physiological system specialized itself in language.

Philosophical anthropology has expressed that relationship between body and language for many ways, since the human person is a language being, or as Cassirer (1965, p.49) claims: The human person as a symbolic animal.

Symbolic language establishes all the mediations of the human organism. Based on that basic control function, which is organized via intuition of a self as a first reference, an explosion of representation possibilities occurs, surpassing the control of the survival functions. Language starts to have a possibility of getting away from the body. Humans live the superposition of the symbolic system to the instinctive one, which has its intersection in the principle of pleasure, as proposed by Freud (2010, pp. 162-1663).

Pleasure is a corporeal and symbolic construction, experienced through a state of satisfaction of the organism, which turns into a reference of the symbolic representations. This satisfaction has a fundamental and referential experience which is the organic joy, or orgasm.

Interiority is part of the situation experience in the world: it is necessary to represent the absent relationship in order to know which



relationship humans should seek to get the satisfaction desired. The absence –emerging from the need– is a starting point of the meanings in the lived world.

Placing language in the body, due to an intuition originated from the cognitive- body, is represented as the own self to get away from this statement “All is language”, as if the symbol were constituent of the body, and not a possibility for the body. It is necessary to call the attention to this ideal aspect since the social practice of language seems to give materiality to the word, as if the word were identical already to the concrete social relationships. The words, however, remain immaterial.

This idealist mistake is possible because once the language is present, the word and culture, it is possible to create afterwards the body, that is, confine the body upon the much larger experience of the concrete corporeality.

Language does not constitute the body in its biological history, but language instituted it in its cultural history. The distinction between constitution and institution of the body is diluted in the person, since from the day humans are born they have a body seen as an object that is culturally constituted-instituted.

This way, the everyday affirmation that “Boy is born as a boy, girl is born as a girl” is created, as a certain sexual morphology, that in the human species is conceived under three groups: feminine, masculine and intersex (Damiani *et al*, 2007) -that is a group that actually presents a great diversity of other groups-, it could be instituted by the state, with the sex field of the birth certificate. This way, the group that presents variety is not instituted- today named by the science intersex-making the family institute socially a sex for the biological constituted child in a diverse morphological condition. What is different cannot exist, it cannot be denominated either.

It is the victory of culture over the body making bend to the limit of the state.

For this reason, from a psychological and social-political perspective, this order is relevant: First, the biological constitution of the body;

and then, the institution of the body by a social practice in language.

In order to understand the emerging of the cognitive-body, it is necessary to do some research on intuition of the self that precedes the word, otherwise the only aim would be to philosophize about the powers exercised by hegemonic groups on the body through instituted languages, without the possibility of the new language and therefore, new liberties.

How can a body become a semantic self, that is, a self that is a constructor of meanings? The question is that the person is in the situation. Such meeting is the *intuition of the semantic-self*.

That instant, before the semantic-self is called a contracted-self - as Henry Bergson thought- that needs to expand and express itself. Bergson (1988, pp. 89-90) believed that the expression was a part of consciousness which, in its initial stage, would be intuition. Due to his vital position, Bergson seems to be in search of a non-materialist principle for life. Biology, however, shows that the material movement, in its search for a balance and a lesser consumption of energy, associated to a huge cosmological time for such movement, originated life and, thus, consciousness (Barrow & Tipler, 1988, pp. 556-570).

At this point, it is sufficient to know that this semantic-self is placed in a world that incites it to create and make changes of meanings through language. In this way, from the biological base, language will be mentioned with the possibility of experiencing two orders of replicators: the genetic and the linguistic ones.

For Dawkins (1979, p. 211), the biological replicators -the genes- made their way to cultural replicator -the memes. The memes use symbolic elements as a means for replication, copying themselves faithfully, joining in networks as texts or images. Memes reproduce with less variability than genes, but they last throughout time.

Through the memes, culture imposes its institutions to the genetic constitutions, by means of big networks, some of them called “identities”, others called “sexuality” or “gender”



and so on, superposing a social order on the biological order.

For the person, this represents a process of intuition -expression of his self and his sexuality within a world of the body and of society. For every intuition of the self, sexuality expresses itself in a unique way; this is called sexual identity (Luck and Schramm, 2009). Thus, the self feels its cognitive body, its sexuality and looks for its expression.

Meanwhile, this sexual identity begins by the placement of the cognitive body: it is biologically placed in a sexual morphology, in a condition, the feminine and the masculine ones being more frequent than the intersex ones.

In this medical ontology, it is necessary to consider a political sequence that places people classified as intersex out of citizenship. The prefix “inter” invokes that this sexual morphology is a non-morphology and, therefore, almost inhuman.

The variety of intersex conditions puts in doubt the daily practice of using a binary model to refer to sexual morphology. Besides, if for some of these conditions there is a need for medical intervention, in other conditions the person might function well with the body of birth, without the need of modifying this body so as to adapt it to the field of “sex” with scarcely two alternatives, because the State demands it.

The condition established by the sexual morphology of birth will not change naturally: it corresponds to the first situation of the body. This situation can cause a conflict and the first transcendence for the cognitive body, which is the transsexual condition, this is, the conflict between the sexual morphology of the body and how it is perceived by the semantic self.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to explain the sense of transcendence in phenomenology, since essentialist philosophies make an approximation between transcendence and immaterial and, finally, significance and soul.

According to phenomenology, the human existence is a tension between immanence and transcendence: the cognitive body is placed in a world and by means of transcendence it projects

itself and moves towards the new. Evidently, transcendence is freedom in relation to current immanence. Without transcendence, people are meant to live the same way all the time (Merleau-Ponty, 2006b, pp. 10, 211).

Here can be observed in the intersection of phenomenology, existentialism and social critique: transcendence is the process of both the individual and social Utopias of personal and historical revolutions.

On the other hand, this phenomenological transcendence differs from metaphysical transcendence, which includes in its reflection an essential reality that is different from the lived world. For essentialist philosophies, transcendence is a *metaphysical* transformation of reality, though it is a historical process: it is a history that ends in *another* immaterial reality, an order that is completed out of time, beyond history.

For phenomenology, the cognitive body is placed in history, since the point of departure and arrival is always the lived world. Transcendence is delimited to the possibilities of the body, it is not necessary to project it in an immaterial order, since is not possible.

Once phenomenological transcendence has been differentiated from metaphysical transcendence, the conflict between the cognitive body and the sexual morphology of birth can be discussed.

In its concretion, the body is placed in a sexual morphology of birth; however, the “self” of the cognitive body feels other morphology and begins a transcendence process of the sexual morphology, the modification of the body and inside the body.

Although science can discuss the reasons of this conflict between body of birth and sexual identity, from a philosophical point of view, the process takes place because there is a cognitive body with the possibility of transcending. Given that sexual morphology is a situation of the body, consciousness moves in order to transcend it.

The difference between this movement and any other movement of further transcendence is that the adaptation processes between



the intuition self and sexual morphology is contained within the process of intuition of the self; thus, becoming a project that precedes all the other expressions of the person.

This process is called *sexual identity*, since it is a question of the internal relation of the cognitive body in its sexual morphology and its reference to language.

Body to language can be wrongly reduced, reducing questions of sexual identity to questions of gender identity, thus hampering the assistance to people who really have issues with sexual identity for having erased the body before the social relations.

Such reduction happens because gender is a cultural construction that can be defined as follows:

- Gender: Set of practices, representations, role functions, values and procedures that a society establishes by means of culture for a person, in agreement with the morphology of his/her body.

It is necessary to keep in mind that Os Príncípios de Yogyakarta (UN, 2006, p. 7), define *identity of gender*, emphasizing, the situations of sexual identity under the expression “*personal sense of the body*”:

- Identity of gender: The internal and individual experience of gender of every person, that can or not correspond to the sex attributed at the birth, including the personal sense of the body (that can involve for free choice, modification of the appearance or corporal function through medical, surgical or different means) and other expressions of gender, including clothing, the way of speaking, and gestures.

This reduction of the body to gender happens for a practical social reason: the people who have issues on sexual identity are going to question the roles of gender culturally attributed to

their sexual morphology of birth. Therefore, it is possible to assume that if there is an issue of sexual identity, there will consequently be a question of identity of gender.

A frequently forgotten aspect is that an issue of gender identity is not necessarily a question of sexual identity. The person can scarcely question the gender that is proposed by culture, without the intuition of adequacy or inadequacy of his/her sexual morphology of birth.

For this reason, the definition of sexual identity is separated from that of gender:

- Sexual identity: A process through which the person senses, feels and expresses which body morphology is adequate for him/her.

Therefore, sexual identity refers to an intuition of the cognitive body and gender identity refers to the expression of this body inside a certain cultural repertoire.

The intention is to be cautious when creating criteria for classifying and investigating on the reasons for this desire to classify. It is necessary to recall Foucault (1996, p. 53) and to think that classification systems are systems of *power*. Hence, the initial purpose of classifying a person or a group of people is an exercise of power, no matter if it is the case of an exercise of rights, or the application of punishment, in the case of the State.

Therefore, the State considers that *identities* in general and, in particular *lgbti –lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex identities*– should be subjected to rights, duties, punishment, depending on the political flavor of moment. It is necessary to focus on this aspect, since there is a tendency among movements that are for and against *lgbti* people, to assume, in an idealistic and essentialist manner, these identities and, consequently, their rights or penalties.

Identities are not definite, since they are not ideal essentials that inform reality. Identities are processes and, therefore, they experience changes.



As for the relation between the processes of identity and corporeality, post-structuralist investigations on the gender lead to an approach assumed during the development of phenomenology that, from a new perspective, needs to be adopted once again.

In the same way that structuralist investigations conducted by Levi-Strauss helped Merleau-Ponty to discuss on wild ontology as a pre-reflexive ontology (Merleau-Ponty, 1990, pp. 58-61), the post-structuralist questions on gender gives rise to investigations on pre-gender corporeality, that is to say, the fundamental freedom of the cognitive body prior to the cultural destinations that have been attributed by the definitions of gender that consider the sexual morphology of the body.

This means to start by considering gender as a category of historical analysis and as a constitutive element of social relations based on the distinctions between sexual morphology and the establishment of power relations (Scott, 1999, c.2, II, §3) and, therefore, a source of rights, and the respective debate on them, for the examination of gender as a category that allows for the delimitation of the subject's immanence in the phenomenological analysis. Because of the purpose of this text, it is not necessary to deepen this analysis, but it is necessary to emphasize its importance, due to the need for specific discussion on pre-gender corporeality, that is, on corporeality that, even in the immanence of diverse sexual morphologies, is transcendent in its experience, in spite of the categorical imposition of a cultural binary system.

With the purpose of defending people's rights on sexual orientation and gender identity, the principles of Yogyakarta also provide a definition of sexual orientation:

- Sexual orientation: the capacity that every person has to experience a deep emotional, affective or sexual attraction for individuals of different gender, of the same gender or of more than one gender, as well as having

sexual relations with these people (UN, 2006, p.7).

Sexual orientation finally directs the person *to the other*. It answers the question "What kind of gender do people tend to feel emotional, affective, intimate and sexual attraction for?"

Therefore, considering the psychological aspect, sexual orientation is the characteristic of one's insufficiency for accomplishing sexuality: not only the other becomes necessary, since this other has a certain gender, a certain sexual morphology, a certain presence.

The diffuse nature of sexuality leads to the external cognitive body and its placement in the lived world. It allows for the development of research on the social aspect of sexual identity and gender identity: sociableness as the anthropologic foundation of sexual education.

3.2. Sociableness

In everyday life, sexuality does not seem so diverse when it is observed socially. If a teenager is asked about his/her future, the probable answer is: to grow, to marry and to have children.

If someone moved directly from the free love movement of the 1960s to the year 2010 would be quite surprised to discover that one of the demands of the *lgbti* movement is just the possibility of establishing a family. Nothing would seem more conservative than getting marry and having children, even if it is a gay couple. For many times, a revolution, instead of creating new paths, seeks hardy to widen paths that already exist

In its social aspect, the person does not build himself/herself: it is governed by a heteronomy condition. The world does not begin when people are born and, thus, every person who enters the society finds an established order, called civilization.

A state of civilization tends to be a state of denial of animality and human corporeity, since it is a state that imposes order by means of



practices and norms that discipline the bodies and the social relations, included a sexual morality. Both sexual identity and sexual orientation, emerging from body conditions, begin to be disciplined by the available cultural repertoire; the result of that discipline is a civilizational order.

In this sense, morality is a language construction that proposes an ideal to the body, in order to avoid that it destroys itself in the satisfaction of the pleasure, moving the body for the productions which serve the society (Marcuse, 2001, pp. 122-123).

The tension between pleasure and reality is also a language construction. The social reality results from a project to seek pleasure from the hegemonic groups that built it. If in psychoanalysis people distrust pleasure –in the unconscious– people –also need to distrust reality –in hegemonic groups that were established in the socio-historical process.

Civilization is quite challenging, because it consists in consolidating the objectives of survival of the body –which are at the base of human selfishness– with the objectives of the survival of the species –which are at the base of human solidarity and control and power objectives of social groups seeking hegemony.

In a social order – totalitarian or democratic – the search for pleasure in a state of anomie is threatening; thus, civilizing implies imposing controls on aspects of human expression, even in sexuality, to favor desirable strategies in a hegemonic group. It is necessary to annul the human corporeity within some social process to offer a silence paradise of body desires, or even, without body. Civilizing implies creating utopias, even if those utopias are impossible (Freud, 2014, section III).

The social order, by being and order, establishes repression, no matter the order; hence, the wariness with the utopian speeches of a sexuality made or a peaceful coexistence in a diverse world.

When observing the social aspect, cultural diversity is the result of different civilizational processes, which created different patterns of

sexual morality and different forms of repression. However, the repressive character is the common element in them, as a constituent element of civilization.

In this way, multiculturalism needs to deal with geographical and cultural territorial wars. The proclaimed victory of language over nature fails when people have to physically move in the planet by the conflict in their geographical territory, just to discover that they cannot enter the territories of destination due to their cultural difference. In the end, language yields to the concrete defense of the physical territory

On the other hand, a sexual utopia is the opposite of a civilizational project in history, because the pleasure is in the body and is experienced immediately. The body pleasure relies in decades. Another utopia is necessary to displace the energy of the body of a present satisfaction for a future satisfaction. Paradoxically, the survival of the consumption economy needs that urgency of “today”, of the manipulation, of the immediate desire, of a non-reusable planet to sell a new planet for tomorrow. However, the planet cannot live without future and without preservation. The consuming civilizational project that should have a future project destroys the future that is in the present.

The civilizing processes, which by *order* wanted to avoid the self-destruction provoked by a search of short-term pleasure, seem to lead exactly to that self-destruction.

On the one hand, social orders are efficient in limiting people and confining them to rules, starting by their bodies and their sexuality; on the other hand, they generate their own self-destruction, because these are processes moved by hegemonic groups with the power to impose them, which also have the power to be *above* the order and the set of norms imposed, so that hegemonic groups do *not* suppress the destructive elements of their own pursuit of pleasure

The inefficiency of the civilizing process in compensating people for pleasure repressed has generated a guardianship process of sexuality by



the state. Inefficient in repressing and compensating, the state is allowed to co-opt, as a strategy to prevent non-hegemonic groups from gaining social strength and destroying the existing social order.

The result of the contradiction between social order and human sexuality is a constant struggle between the repression imposed by the civilizing project and the needs of expression and relationship in sexuality.

Facing with so many contradictions, people and social groups need projects that overcome the situation created by the social order, so that sociability, as a historical project, also opens the perspective of transcendence, the exercise of social and personal freedom.

3.3. Transcendence

In corporeity –in the conflict with the body morphology in transgender– and in sociability –by the need to break the contradictions of civil projects – is found the need of transcending.

Transcendence will have its risks, because it does not represent the lived world but a future world, a possibility from the lived world. An important distinction is that if the world lived is immanent to the concrete limitations: the natural world, the biology of the body and the current social relations; the future world is completely transcendent and, even those limitations, if considered, are possible constructions in language, without the need to clarify the *establishment* of that possibility

The constructive and transcendent characteristic of language is its power and its ambush.

A closer examination of language allows verifying that it can be logical, pre-logical or non-logical and that the origin of the language does not connect directly with the logic. The logical language is preceded by the mythical language and myth is the first cultural articulation of transcendence. Thus, there is a non-logical order, which is the order of the myth and, if there is any order, it is possible to propose a moral discipline for the body.

Being considered under the psychological aspect, transcendence represents the before and the after language.

As creative as it may be, language limits to what the cognitive body and the living world produce in their interactions and go beyond its creative capacity. There is a depletion of words and metaphors and, then, it is necessary to remain in silence. For that reason, Wittgenstein called this process “mystical,” since there is a contemplative consciousness says nothing (Wittgenstein, 2017, p. 261).

Between these two extreme experiences –the origin and exhaustion of language– must be asked: what is the *source* of the meaning process that originates the development of language and, thus, the possibility of transcendence representations?

One more time is needed to assert to the principle of corporeity: The beginning is in the body and its most primitive and universal experiences: body, conception, gestation, birth, relations with the natural elements, relations with the recreation of life, death.

There is a historical controversy if in fact there are “universal symbols” or “universal grammar” and, for philosophers that is a famous and recurrent problem: the question of universals. For the limits of the reflection, it is enough to say that the meaning process needs a present element –the symbol in its expression– is an absent element –its meaning, which by it is *re-presented*.

Among all the categories and pre-reflective experiences possible to human, the most important is the ability to establish relationships. The reason for these relationships is the link between pleasure and necessity. The development of this capacity is given by the most fundamental desires that constitute sexuality and as Freud stated (1972, pp. 177-178), are presented from childhood, characterizing child sexuality.

Freud discovery shows that the relations with the lived world have a first moment in this search of satisfaction of the body’s desires: oral, anal, genital, which show themselves and constitute metaphors for other meanings, becoming paradigmatic experiences.



Symbols and myths reflect such models on lived worlds and their possibilities of transcendence, which had meanings for human groups, without excluding the power relations, in which groups imposed their myths to other groups.

From the social point of view, a civilizational project needs transcendence in order to propose a new social order.

On the other hand, it is known that no relationship depletes the need for human pleasure. The frustration remains, since it is the door of transcendence, of the search for a new and an absent.

This experience of anxiety, of a search that never ends, of permanence of desire, points towards a continuous experience that extends by the time and suggests the eternity, the mystic and the contemplation.

That perspective somehow optimistic has its price. In the mythical language, the suppression of sexuality and the address of pleasure for social objectives are given by the taboo. The taboo is a restriction to action, based on symbolic areas that evidence the imposition of a sexual discipline before there is a logical ordering of language.

By instituting a new order, the taboo confers a historical character on the proposal of transcendence and only the distinction between mythical structure and system of rational laws will differentiate a mythical-religious moral order from an ethical order.

On the path of creating the metaphor of corporeal joy to eternal joy, the body was glorified, that is, unused in its experiences of sexuality, as proposed by Agamben (2015, p. 133). In the idealistic transcendent world, even if there is a body, joy does not belong to it, then it is necessary to discipline and suppress the joy of the body, so that the soul may enjoy eternity.

However, even the idealistic mystic needs to have by reference the joy, whose experience is only possible by the corporeity. Without the corporeity and its language, by which relations are expressed, one does not have to transcend.

When philosophy breaks with idealism, as is the case of psychoanalysis and anthropology,

there is the extension of the body experience in successive metaphors, until rediscovering the pleasure by the language, or pleasure is represented by that metaphor of eternal joy, as a personal or historical project.

Also psychoanalysis and anthropology, at some point, will enter the realm of idealistic utopias, as they consider the hypothesis of healing human frustration, which is not possible. That utopia became the small utopia capable of reducing the great psychoses in small neurosis.

In the face of constant frustration, instead of the negative trait of the alienation of the body by some mythical or logical structure, the constructive trait of the challenge of building freedom can be used.

From the phenomenological point of view, transcendence refers to the immanent condition in which the cognitive body remains -that is its situation. There is no possibility of transcending the cognitive body. When such possibility is affirmed, idealism and moral disciplines without a body are being used again. Instead of that body abandonment, it is possible to project the world lived for a new world, by means of metaphors of the lived that lead to the new one. The absence revealed by desire is built in a world of possibilities and presences.

Therefore, there is a commitment to think about the experiences of sexuality in its ethical limits, without people being transformed into objects of affective, emotional and sexual relations, as a sexual order that is based on the cognitive body, from which are derived the main conditions of sociability and transcendence.

4. Conclusions

The objective was to discuss the fundamentals of corporeity, sociability and transcendence for the sexual education process.

The challenge for education is not to abandon the body once there is desire to build a future that does not yet exist by means of transcendence, having as language as a resource,



which can be reduced only to social practice and constituting a disconnection process of the body.

Corporeity can be an ethical foundation of sex education to the extent that the respect for the situation of the body consists of an inquiry into the world lived in those bodies, the cognitive body. Therefore, the body ceases to be the cover of an essentialist conception of the soul or an idealistic conception of language, to be the own human experience in its different relationships, even the sexual.

Even though corporeity is an important foundation it is not sufficient, because it is impossible to suppress the other –and with it the sociability– or reject the transcendence –and with it both the desire and the search for satisfaction and, finally, the happiness.

It is proposed to construct an anthropology and an educational proposal of the integrality of the human person from the body in the lived world, in the emergence of cognitive body, its relations and its ontologies, like new meanings and new constructive experiences, in the concretion and the biological, social, civilization and historical limitations that constitute and institute humans.

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